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Ethereum network introduced executable programming called smart contracts to blockchain 
technology ecosystem. With the ability to have executable smart contracts on a blockchain 
network, decentralised applications (DAPPs) started to reach the consumer market. As with 
every kind of executable programming the information security is an important part of smart 
contract development. The field is still relatively young; the Ethereum network and the 
smart contracts were brought to the public domain in 2015.  Since then, the Ethereum 
network as well as the smart contract programming language, Solidity, has been rapidly 
developing and there are no extensive guidelines for secure development of smart contracts. 
This is the reason for researching smart contract security in this thesis. 
Blockchain technology overview is included in this thesis and is used as the basis to deduct 
the smart contract security aspects that need to be considered when writing smart contracts. 
Blockchain network types, elements and their interactions are analysed, to provide further 
background in the workings of the blockchain technology. Understanding how transactions 
are executed, how accounts are represented, the on-chain executable logic and how inter-
chain communication is executed, is crucial to secure the development of smart contracts. 
Decentralised application security is broken down into blockchain network security, secure 
blockchain network governance, smart contract security and DAPP interaction security. 
Blockchain network security is analysed by comparing the relationship between the chain 
data integrity and transaction throughputs, as well as how the consensus algorithm of the 
blockchain network can impact the security of the data transmitted over it. Critical secure 
node mass is explained and its relationship to network security as well. 
Smart contract security is a multi-layered term. Smart contract execution sequence is 
explained in detail as well as how standardization is emerging in smart contract 
development. Zero-hour exploits, as well as third party code snippets, are detailed in 
relation to smart contract security. Smart contract weakness classification is explained. 
Secure smart contract deployment, code reviews and code verification are also discussed in 
detail. Finally, the way of how users and developers interact with smart contracts through 
DAPPs is discussed. 
DAPP security best practices are outlined starting with the CIA information security triad 
and passive and active smart contract security. Multi smart contract solutions, hybrid 
blockchain – server architectures, atomic swaps and blockchain network load predictions 
and testing are detailed in this chapter. 
The practical part of the thesis focuses on applying the previously analysed and outlined 
smart contract security practices to smart contract back end of a DAPP called Swether. 
Swether is an electrical charging solution that uses Ethereum network as its backend. The 
pre-thesis solution is presented and required improvements are presented. It was built in a 
monolithic manner, meaning there was one smart contract that handled all of the business 
logic as well as data storage and access control. The monolithic smart contract is separated 
into seven self-contained modules, which are thoroughly analysed and designed. The 
modules are classified into platform-agnostic, platform-specific and auxiliary groups. 
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Platform agnostic group of modules is applicable to any project and it provides essential 
service for the whole platform. They provide per-module access control and module to 
address resolution service. Platform-specific group of modules contains business logic 
specific to the platform; in this case specific to charging station service. Auxiliary group of 
modules brings additional value to the platform and the modules contained in it can be used 
in various platforms but are not essential for the operation of the platform. Swether auxiliary 
modules are Loyalty, Escrow and Accumulator. 
Transitioning from a single smart contract environment to a multi smart contract 
environment required a secure way of inter-module access control. Smart Contract 
Tunnelling (SCT) is introduced to provide secure authentication and access control. SCT 
utilizes a platform-agnostic group of modules to verify the correct path of the transaction 
as well as access control for the origin user of the transaction. 
Each module was designed for upgradeability and data transfer. This means that if a module 
is upgraded, the access control can be transferred from the previous version of the module 
and all of the other modules are notified of the update, so that the update is seamless, and 
the operation of the platform is not interrupted. 
After the successful implementation of the security upgrade of Swether platform, all the 
smart contracts were analysed using MythX smart contract security audit tool. The results 
are presented and analysed. 
Finally, the roadmap for the future of Swether is laid out and the possible further 
improvements are presented. 
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Ethereum omrežje je v ekosistem tehnologij veriženja blokov vneslo izvršljive programske 
kode. Z možnostjo uporabe izvršljivih pametnih pogodb so decentralizirane aplikacije 
(DAPPs) dosegle končne uporabnike. Kot pri vsakem pisanju izvršljive programske kode, 
je tudi pri pametnih pogodbah pomembna informacijska varnost. Področje je še relativno 
mlado; Ethereum omrežje in pametne pogodbe so v javno uporabo prišli leta 2015. Od takrat 
sta se Ethereum omrežje in programski jezik za pisanje pametnih pogodb, Solidity, hitro 
razvijala, vendar ekstenzivne smernice za varen razvoj pametnih pogodb ne obstajajo. To 
je razlog za raziskovanje področja varnosti pametnih pogodb v tem delu. 
V delu je vključen pregled tehnologije blokovnih verig kot osnova za izpeljavo sklepov o 
varnosti pametnih pogodb, ki jih je treba upoštevati pri programiranju pametnih pogodb. 
Tipi omrežij veriženja blokov, elementi teh omrežij in njihove interakcije so analizirani 
tako, da podajo dodatno ozadje v delovanje tehnologije veriženja blokov. Razumevanje 
postopka izvedbe transakcij, prezentacije računov, izvršljive logike vključene v blokih in 
kako se izvaja komunikacija med različnimi omrežji veriženja blokov, so nujne za 
razumevanje delovanja pametnih pogodb. 
Varnost decentraliziranih aplikacij je razdeljena na varnost omrežij veriženja blokov, 
varnosti nadzora nad omrežjem veriženja blokov, varnosti pametnih pogodb in varnosti 
interakcije z decentraliziranimi aplikacijami. Varnost omrežja veriženja blokov je 
analizirana s pomočjo primerjave razmerja med integriteto podatkov shranjenih v blokih in 
hitrostjo transakcij ter z analizo tega, kako lahko konsenzni algoritem omrežja veriženja 
blokov vpliva na varnost podatkov, ki se pretakajo po njem. Kritična varna masa vozlišč je 
razložena skupaj z razlago njenega vpliva na varnost omrežja. 
Varnost pametnih pogodb je večslojen termin. Postopek izvedbe pametnih pogodb je 
podrobno razložen skupaj s postopki standardizacije razvijanja pametnih pogodb, ki se 
pojavljajo. Napadi ničte ure in uporaba tujih delčkov programske kode so razloženi v 
povezavi z varnostjo pametnih pogodb. Klasifikacija šibkosti pametnih pogodb (SWC) je 
razložena. Varno uvajanje pametnih pogodb, revizija kode in verifikacija kode so podrobno 
razloženi. Na koncu poglavja je razložen tudi način, kako razvijalci in uporabniki 
interaktirajo s pametnimi pogodbami prek decentraliziranih aplikacij. 
Dobre prakse decentraliziranih aplikacij so orisane s pomočjo CIA triade infomacijske 
varnosti ter pasivne in aktivne varnosti pametnih pogodb. Rešitve iz več pametnih pogodb, 
hibridne, blokovne verige – strežniki, arhitekture, atomske menjave ter predvidevanja 
obremenitve omrežji blokovnih verig in njihovo testiranje so podrobno razloženi v tem 
poglavju. 
Praktični del teze uporabi predhodno analizirane dobre prakse varnosti pametnih pogodb. 
Te so uporabljene na pametni pogodbi zaledja decentralizirane aplikacije Swether. Swether 
je električna polnilna rešitev, ki uporablja Ethereum omrežje za svoje zaledje. Stanje rešitve 
pred tezo je predstavljeno in potrebne varnostne nadgranje so predstavljene. Rešitev je bila 
zgrajena kot monolitna aplikacija, kar pomeni, da je ena pametna pogodba zagotavljala vso 
poslovno logiko kot tudi shranjevanje podatkov in nadzor dostopa. Monolitna pametna 
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pogodba je razdeljena v sedem samostojnih modulov, ki so natačno analizirani in 
načrtovani. Ti moduli so klasificirani v tri skupine: Skupina modulov neodvisnih od 
platforme, skupina modulov specifičnih za platforme in skupina dodatnih modulov. Moduli 
neodvisni od platforme so moduli, ki so lahko uporabljeni v kakršnikoli platformi in 
zagotavljajo nujne storitve za celotno platformo. Ti moduli zagotavljajo nadzor dostopa in 
storitev razločanja naslovov. V platformi Swether sta to modula Administracija (angl. 
Administration) in Direktorij pametnih pogodb (angl. Smart contract directory). 
Administracija vsem pametnim pogodbam v platformi zagotavlja nadzor dostopa in podpira 
štiri različne nivoje dostopnih pravic. Direktorij pametnih pogodb predstavlja imena 
naslovov vseh aktivnih pametnih pogodb, povezanih z moduli, ki jim pripadajo. Specifični 
moduli za platforme zagotavljajo poslovno logiko specifično za platformo, v primeru 
Swethra je to logika za storitev električnega polnjenja (angl. Charging station directory). 
Med module specifične za platformo spada tudi Jedrni modul (angl. Core). Ta modul se 
povezuje z vsemi ostalimi moduli in je edini modul, s katem interaktira končni uporabnik. 
Za posredovanje klicev ostalim modulom uporablja Direktorij pametnih pogodb, da razreši 
naslov pametne pogodbe iz imena modula, v katerega posreduje klic. Dodatni moduli 
zagotavljajo dodano vrednost platformi. Moduli, ki se nahajajo v tej skupini niso nujni za 
delovanje platforme in so lahko uporabljeni v katerikoli platformi. Dodatni moduli 
platforme Swether so moduli, ki zagotavljajo nagrajevanje zvestobe (angl. Loyalty), 
plačevanje storitve s posrednikom (angl. Escrow) in zbiranje zasluženih sredstev (angl. 
Accumulator). Modul nagrajevanja zvestobe uporablja standardizirane kovance ERC 20 za 
nagrajevanje uporabnikov za uporabo platforme. Plačevanje storitve s posrednikom 
omogoča, da uporabnik nakaže plačilo za polnjenje, ki je nakazano ponudniku polnjenja 
šele, ko je polnjenje opravljeno. Na ta način lahko dvignemo nivo zaupanja uporabnikov 
storitve polnjenja in ponudnikov polnjenja, saj zagotovimo, da nihče ne izgubi sredstev, le 
ena izmed strani odstopi od dogovora o polnjenju oziroma plačila. Modul za zbiranje 
zasluženih sredstev omogoča lastnikom električnih polnilnic, da izberejo, kdaj in kam želijo 
nakazati sredstva, ki so jih prejeli s ponujanjem polnjenja. 
Prehod z ene pametne pogodbe na več pametnih pogodb potrebuje varen način 
komunikacije med moduli. Tuneliranje med pametnimi pogodbami (angl. Smart Contract 
Tunnelling -- SCT) je bilo razvito, da zagotavlja varno avtentikacijo in kontrolo dostopa. 
SCT uporablja module neodvisne od platforme, da verificira pot transakcije kot tudi nadzor 
dostopa do klicev za izvornega klicatelja transakcije. Jedrni modul uporablja SCT za 
vzpostavitev tunela z modulom tako, da posreduje klic metode pametni pogodbi ciljnega 
modula, kjer pridobi njen naslov prek Direktorija pametnih pogodb. Pred izvršitvijo metode 
ciljni modul preveri, če je izvornemu računu transakcije dovoljen klic metode s pomočjo 
Administracije. Hkrati ciljni modul izvede preverbo, če je klic posredoval modul, ki mu je 
dovoljeno posredovanje klica te metode, kar naredi s pomočjo Direktorija pametnih 
pogodb. Le če obe preverbi vrneta dovoljen klic, potem je metoda izvršena. 
Vsak modul je bil zgrajen z upoštevanjem možnosti nadgrajevanja in prenosa informacij. 
To pomeni, da se, v primeru nadgraditve modula, lahko prenese pravice dostopa iz 
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predhodne verzije in da so vsi ostali moduli obveščeni o nadgradnji. Tako je nadgradnja 
brezprekinitvena in delovanje platforme nemoteno. 
Po uspešni implementaciji varnostne nadgradnje platforme Swether so bile vse pametne 
pogodbe analizirane z orodjem MythX, ki je orodje za varnostno analizo pametnih pogodb. 
Orodje je zaznalo 179 kršitev, ki so bile vse namerno vključene. MythX zazna kršitve SWC, 
ki so sprejemljive v primerih, ko so bile vključene z razumevanjem ranljivosti, ki jih 
prinašajo. 
Na koncu je začrtana pot mogoča za nadaljne nadgradnje platforme Swether, ki predstavi 
prehod na konzorcijsko omrežje. Slednje vsebuje tudi vključitev atomske zamenjave, 
dodajanje novih modulov in standardizacijo SCT mehanizma. 
 
Ključne besede: Blokovne verige, Tehnologija veriženja blokov, Pametne pogodbe, 
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1. Introduction 
In the last decade, distributed technologies have been developing rapidly. Distributed 
technologies are technologies that utilize multiple physically separate machines to provide 
computational service as a single more powerful machine. A subset of these are the 
distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) which are digital systems for recording transactions, 
database or monetary transactions, in multiple places at the same time. They have no central 
data storage or administration functionality. One of these technologies is blockchain 
technology. Maturing blockchain networks with the ability to host executable programs are 
proving to be a viable technology to host many of the modern-day emerging technologies. 
IoT solutions such as Swether[1], which is discussed at length in this thesis, can benefit 
from the distributed aspects of blockchain networks. Smart grid technologies can greatly 
benefit from the trustless design of technology. 
Majority of the use cases utilizing blockchain technology require smart contracts to provide 
blockchain-based executable logic. Smart contracts, like any other executable piece of 
software, has to be developed following certain guidelines and principles. This thesis is 
focusing on the security aspect of smart contract development as an extension of DAPP 
development. 
All the DAPPs and blockchain networks that are currently in the existence or in 
development can to some extent credit Bitcoin as their origin, as it was the first public 






   
3 
2. Blockchain technology 
2.1.Blockchain overview 
2.1.1.History 
The first generation of blockchain technology was developed as an open-source project to 
support the illegal online market Silkroad. It was meant to support anonymous decentralised 
trade of weapons, drugs and other illegal services and substances. Shathoshi Nakamoto[2] 
is the name that is most associated with it since it was an online pseudonym of a developer 
or a group of developers that first designed the decentralised database network that was 
used in monetary transfers that came to be known as Bitcoin trades. The first 
implementation of this technology is noted in 2009 as stated by the first Bitcoin block[3] 
timestamp. 
The first generation of blockchain technology was thus centred around secure verifiable 
monetary transactions. In the beginning, the scope of technology’s impact on global society 
was unclear, so while the algorithm was secure, it was very memory intensive. This 
prompted the development of CPU confirmations, later known as mining. While the 
algorithm in itself was groundbreaking, being the first decentralised backend computing 
solution, it was increasingly impactful in the energy aspect. In the most wasteful time, the 
Bitcoin blockchain demanded more energy than the whole of Switzerland in the same time 
span. Thus, alternative solutions were starting to develop. 
Alternative solutions that were developing under the influence of the Bitcoin blockchain 
also realised that decentralised computing could be the future of the Internet. The most 
prominent of them was Ethereum blockchain. It implemented monetary transactions, 
backed by Ether cryptocurrency, as well as execution of decentralised blockchain backend 
policies called Smart contracts. This was the beginning of second-generation blockchains. 
They supported both native monetary transactions as well as mechanisms to support 
decentralised blockchain applications known as DAPPs (Decentralised Applications). Since 
Ethereum’s launch in 2015[4] a lot of other blockchain technology implementations have 
tried to emulate its functionalities, changing one part of the algorithm or the other. 
While the second generation of blockchain solved a few issues that were introduced in the 
first generation, their transaction, and consequently processing, throughput was limited, 
there were groups of developers that called for another generation of blockchain, that was 
more focused on decentralised backend processing rather than monetary transactions. This 
generation introduced alternative confirmation protocols to the Proof of Work (PoW), most 
notably Proof of Stake (PoS), where instead of confirmation nodes solving increasingly 
difficult cryptographic puzzles, as it is in PoW, the confirmation nodes rather stake some 
of their monetary assets that are native to the blockchain they are using, binding themselves 
to solve the cryptographic puzzle and being responsible for their submission with their own 
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funds. While that was alleviating the energy demand of processing and confirmations of 
blockchain participants, their throughput remained low (13 transactions per seconds[5] 
compared to Visa centralised debit card solution able to process thousands of transactions 
per second[6]). Subsequently leading to blockchain protocols that had much higher 
transaction per second than earlier generations of this technology. 
Currently, we can observe the third generation of blockchain technology being developed. 
Starting in 2016, a lot of different solutions were proposed. Some used semi-centralised 
architectures to achieve higher throughput while others abolished the monetary aspect of 
their predecessors altogether in favour of higher decentralised computing processing. Like 
second-generation blockchain, they proposed new transaction confirmation algorithms. 
These algorithms not only changed the way transactions are processed but changed the 
network architecture of their decentralised networks. IOTA blockchain proposed tangle[7], 
which has tree-leaf architecture, while solutions like Stellar proposed Delegated Proof of 
Stake (DPoS)[8], which delegates transaction confirmation authority to upstream nodes in 
the architecture. 
2.1.1.1.Blockchain technological families 
Blockchain technology implementations all presented some issues, be it the transaction 
throughput, processing limitation or reliability of the network, to various groups of 
developers. Some had ideas on how to improve them in order to alleviate said issues, but 
most of the development community was against them. Since the developers desired to 
implement those issues, they derived their own blockchains from the original ones and 
applied the desired changes. Derived blockchains and the original blockchains are very 
similar and belong to the same blockchain family. This is why Bitcoin and Ripple belong 
to the same blockchain family as well as Ethereum and Tron belong to their own. 
2.1.2.Trust and decentralisation 
Blockchain technology in its essence is decentralised peer-to-peer communication type of 
technology. Based on the intended use case and required specifications of the network there 
are various implementations. The implementations vary between transaction throughput, 
required level of distribution, speed of transaction verification, speed of verified block 
propagation and number of transactions included in a single block. An important factor in 
blockchain classification is the generation of a blockchain. Blockchain generations, their 
properties and specifics have been discussed in more detail in subchapter 2.1.1. 
While there is an abundance of differences between implementations, there are a few key 
characteristics that are common to all of the blockchain technologies. The most important 
ones are decentralisation, immutability and high level of encryption. 
Decentralisation refers to the way information is stored and processed. All of the blockchain 
ledger database transactions and smart contract calls are multicast to the verification nodes 
and then later included into the blocks. The information ledger, that consists of blocks, 
containing various numbers of transactions, is stored in a substantial number of places. After 
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the block is prepared, it is broadcasted to all of the participating nodes on the network and 
these nodes can then store the block and expand the previously existing information ledger. 
Immutability of the information ledger and transactions written into a blockchain is one of 
the most known characteristics of the technology. It derives from the same functionality, 
for which the technology itself was named. Every block in a chain refers to the hash of most 
recent previous blocks. This results in severely increased difficulty of data and transaction 
manipulation. In the event of data or transaction tampering or alterations, the hash of the 
block in which the change occurs changes and with it also the hash connecting it to all of 
the previous blocks. Furthermore, all of the blocks after that one are now referencing the 
chain that does not exist anymore and the whole ledger becomes unusable. Due to this 
mechanic, even the alteration by one malicious user on one node is effectively detected and 
the malicious ledger is discarded by other nodes. 
High level of encryption allows a highly expandable service backend while keeping it 
secure enough for it to be reliable while supporting the ever-growing user base. The base 
encryption used in the network varies from blockchain to blockchain, but there is an 
unwritten consensus of using at least 256-bit encryption protocols. 
All of the before-mentioned mechanics and properties of blockchain technology are the 
reason why users can have trust in technology. The environment itself is trust-less but 
knowing that there is only one result for every action that a user can take gives it trust 
needed for successful operation. 
The trust into a decentralized technology to be deterministic and have auditable behaviour 
is in contrast to that of the centralized trust, which is based on trusting an entity that provides 
a service that the execution of said service will be in accordance with the user’s expectations. 
2.1.3.Consensus and confirmation algorithms 
Blockchain implementations all have some sort of confirmation algorithm defined for 
confirmation nodes to have a standardized way of how to confirm that the transactions are 
valid and ensure the integrity of the chain. 
Consensus algorithm refers to the way agreement on the validity of the changes in the 
network is achieved and enforced. Ethereum blockchain for example uses the Longest chain 
persistence[9] to handle unintentional forks of the chain to select the valid chain. It also 
assumes that the data that 51% or more nodes in the network have is valid. 
Various consensus algorithms are implemented in different blockchains. The oldest is the 
Proof of Work algorithm, where the confirmation nodes continuously try to solve the ever-
increasing cryptographic puzzles and, when successful, they seal a new block and propagate 
it to the network. 
Proof of Stake is the consensus algorithm in which the confirmation nodes stake a part of 
their finances in order to have a chance to be selected to seal a block. If the sealing is 
successful, the node is usually rewarded, but if there is any malicious activity in the block, 
all of the staked finances are taken from the confirmator. 
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There are other consensus algorithms, like the Delegated Proof of Stake, which delegates 
the confirming of the transactions to the upstream nodes, or Proof of Authority[10] (PoA), 
where confirmation nodes stake their reputation rather than monetary assets when 
confirming transactions, but the Proof of Stake and Proof of Work are the most widely 
implemented. 
2.2.Architecture 
In terms of blockchain architecture, we can discuss the architecture of the network based 
on the amount of decentralization present in the network, logical architecture, which would 
consist of smart contracts and other entities providing some sort of service or we could 
discuss tenants. The first subchapter will discuss network architectures based on who 
controls them, the second one will discuss network architectures based on tenants while the 
third one will connect the latter two. 
2.2.1.Network types 
Based on the way the networks are accessed, there are three types of networks. There are 
public networks, consortium networks and private networks. 
Public networks are networks that anyone can connect to and are accessible to everyone. 
Decisions on the future and changes of these networks are made by all of the participants 
in the network. They are the biggest and the most well-known. Some of these are Ethereum 
network, Bitcoin network, IOTA tangle and a lot more. 
Consortium networks are networks that are implemented by certain organizations. 
Decisions on future and changes of these networks are made by the organization that owns 
the network.  Organizations use consortium networks to utilize the benefits of blockchain 
technology while interacting with other organizations or their customers. These networks 
can only be accessed if the organization in charge of them approves the connection. 
Hyperledger projects are meant to be used as consortium blockchain networks. 
Private networks are used for rapid development. They are deployed and deleted quickly. 
These kinds of networks are only meant for development and there is rarely more than one 
developer or a small team using the same network. There are no changes or future plans for 
these networks since they are briefly live, and data contained in them are disposable. 
2.2.2.Network elements 
Blockchain networks contain specific elements to support their distributed architecture. At 
the core of the connectivity are the bootnodes[11]. They are the nodes that all of the other 
nodes connect to when trying to establish a connection to the network. Bootnodes have to 
always be available since they are used to propagate the information about how to reach 
other nodes that are active on the network. 
Confirmation nodes, also referred to as miner nodes[12], are the nodes validating, 
confirming and executing the transactions. As the transactions are issued by users, they are 
Blockchain technology 7 
 
 
collected in transaction pools of the miners and are then validated for permissions and 
sufficient resources, which includes gas, gas price, and any other resources that the 
transaction might be containing. Once the transactions are packaged into the block, they 
propagate the block to the other nodes. Alternatively, there are mining pools[13] which 
consist of multiple mining nodes sharing the transaction pools and computing resources in 
order to be more competitive when trying to confirm the transaction. The reward for 
creating a block is usually shared within all of the nodes in the mining pool. 
The full nodes[14] participate in the blockchain process by keeping the full information 
ledger and propagating it to the other nodes they are connected to. They help maintain the 
integrity of the blockchain by increasing the number of nodes that contain the full ledger. 
Light nodes[15] are the nodes that participate in the blockchain network but do not maintain 
the full ledger data. They only maintain the last few blocks and are able to send transactions 
on the network. 
Trusted remote nodes are nodes that provide transaction creation and transmission to the 
end-users. One of those is MetaMask[16], that works as a plugin or a standalone mobile 
application and has a blockchain node accessible over standard TCP/IP communication 
available at the MetaMask’s server. This way, the user does not need to have a node running 
on their own device in order to interact with the network. 




Every time the node boots up it has to connect to other nodes before it can send transactions 
and interact with the network. 
Figure 1: Interaction of the node with the network  
Figure 1 depicts how the node connects to the network to send a transaction to Node 3, 
where blue lines are not actual transactions, but represent what end-user experiences when 
initiating a transaction. 
As the node boots up it connects to the bootnode to get the IP addresses and ports to be able 
to share the blockchain data with them. Bootnode provides the node with the data to reach 
the other nodes that are active on the network. When the connection to the nodes is 
established, the nodes start exchanging chain data until the nodes have the latest block and 
then they maintain adjacency by propagating each new block they receive and verify it is 
the same one. 
Once the node is connected to the network it might want to transact some funds to Node 3. 
Firstly, the node builds and signs the transaction. Afterwards, it sends it to the network and 
miners add it to the transaction pool. Once they prepare the block, they include multiple 
transactions in the block and propagate it throughout the network. As the block is included 
in other nodes chain data, the transaction of funds to Node 3 is completed. 




Since blockchain technology is a decentralized technology, it requires dedicated mechanics 
that provide deterministic proofs for all of the transactions, their executions, and 
governance. Some dedicated mechanisms are required to ensure secure inter blockchain 
communications as well as communications between a blockchain and server-based 
services. 
2.3.1.Transaction verification 
Since multiple transactions are verified and included in a single block, their verification has 
to be optimised. This is done by using Merkle trees.  
Figure 2: Merkle tree calculation representation 
Figure 2 represents the calculation of the Merkle tree. Merkle trees allow us to simply verify 
transactions in a block without having to compute the hash of every transaction. For the 
validation of the transaction, we only need the transaction we are verifying and its 
corresponding pair in the Merkle tree. Instead of computing the hashes of all of the 
transactions which would require the computation in  
𝑁 = 2𝑛 − 1 
a number of calculations. Where N is the number of required hashing operations and n is 
the number of layers of the Merkle tree. Using Merkle tree validation of transaction 
requires significantly fewer operations when verifying the transactions. To be particular 
they require 
𝑁 = 𝑛 
operations. Where N means the number of operations required and n is equal to the 
number of layers of the Merkle tree, which means it is the same as there are layers of the 
Merkle tree. 
For example, if we are validating the validity of the transaction A, we only need to 
compute the hash A1, which is a hash of transaction A and B, then we have to compute a 
hash A2, which is a hash of A1 and B1, and lastly, we need to compute the hash of A2 
10 Blockchain technology 
 
 
and B2 which will return the Merkle tree root. This is three hashing operations. When 
building a block, the confirmation node had to compute 7 hashing operations. If the tree 
was bigger by one layer, the number of hashing operations for validating a transaction 
would equal four and number of hashing operations required for calculation of Merkle 
tree when sealing the block would equal 15. 
2.3.2.Accounts 
Accounts[17] are used to sign and direct the transactions. Every account has its own unique 
address which is, coupled with a private key and a passphrase, used to sign the transactions. 
A nonce is a value associated with each account and is also used to sign the transactions to 
further assure that transactions are unique. 
There are different kinds of accounts, end-user accounts, which are used by the nodes 
connecting to the network and communicating with it. These are the accounts from which 
transactions originate. Nonces are bound to these kinds of accounts. They are a number 
representing the number of transactions initiated by the account and are incremented every 
time the account submits a transaction. 
The second kind of accounts is smart contract accounts. They can be destinations of 
transactions and the only way transactions originate from them is when they are triggered 
by an incoming transaction. Nonce of a smart contract account is incremented every time 
there is an inbound transaction that arrives to this kind of account. 
2.3.3.On-chain executable logic 
Blockchain implementations can support on-chain executable logic. These pieces of code 
are called smart contracts. As the smart contracts are deployed to the networks their 
bytecodes[18], which are a form of a set of instructions resulting from the compilation of 
the source code, are calculated and their addresses are assigned. Transactions that are 
directed to an address of a smart contract are verified and the miner executes the logic 
contained in the smart contract. When the execution of the transaction is completed the 
miner includes the transaction and the resulting state of the smart contract’s storage in the 
block. 
2.3.4.Inter-chain interactions 
As there are more and more kinds of blockchain technology implementations available, 
there is a need for them to interact with each other. This is done by inter-chain interactions, 
which are also called atomic swaps. Atomic swaps provide the ability for the data to be 
exchanged between blockchains that use different kinds of consensus algorithms and 
transaction protocols. Since they provide the ability to communicate between two networks 
which implement a high level of security and integrity of the communication, they have to 
be highly robust as well. Atomic swaps, as well as how they have to address the trust, 
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integrity, confidentiality and ownership traceability issues, will be further discussed in the 
subchapter 4.5. 
2.4.Decentralised applications  
Decentralised applications are applications that use decentralised technologies in order to 
be able to operate. They can achieve that by using smart contracts that provide 
computational backend services, like Solidity smart contracts in the Ethereum network, 
Solidity or Golang[19] smart contracts in Hyperledger Fabric[20] and eosio contracts[21] 
on EOS network. Smart contracts can provide various levels of complexity and usability 
based on what network they are hosted and which programming language they are written 
in. Smaller block sizes limit the size of the smart contract source code, which in turn limits 
the complexity of the smart contracts. Programming languages used to write smart contracts 
impact their functionality by supporting different methods. Solidity programming language 
does not support string-based operations, while Go programming language requires 
additional libraries to support blockchain specific behaviour, like account handling. 
Decentralised applications can also use decentralised storage of files, like InterPlanetary 
File System (IPFS)[22] or Swarm[23].  They can use a decentralised routing service to 
provide the addresses of the desired destinations for the transactions that they execute, like 
Ethereum Name Service (ENS)[24]. 
In chapter 5 a decentralised application Swether will be examined in detail. 
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3. Decentralised application security 
Decentralised application security is a layered term that is connected to all of the security 
aspects of them. It pertains to network security, secure governance, secure architecture, 
smart contract security and interaction security. For a DAPP to be secure for the users as 
well as the team providing it, all of these aspects have to be carefully analysed and applied. 
3.1.Network security 
Network security in relation to DAPP is blockchain network security. Blockchain networks 
are decentralized, but the level of distribution can vary, which can impact the speed of the 
network as well as its integrity. 
3.1.1.Integrity vs. speed 
The time required for a transaction from the moment a user signs it and sends it to the 
network to the moment it is acknowledged by most of the participants on the network is 
transaction latency. 
Blockchain networks are notoriously slow compared to the legacy server-based 
technologies. They can process a fraction of the transactions[25] of server-based solutions. 
Lower transaction throughputs are a result of consensus algorithms that require more time 
to confirm transactions than server-based validations. 
Various solutions implementing blockchain technology employ different approaches on 
how to increase the number of transactions per second that the network can process. If the 
block time is too short, then new blocks can be sealed before the convergence is reached 
throughout the network and if more and more blocks are added in the non-converged 
networks, the network can get too fragmented with various forks of chains, that even 
consensus algorithm cannot achieve convergence again. 
If the network doesn’t allow for full convergence of chain data between blocks, this allows 
for double-spending attacks or inability to provide a reliable DAPP since the transaction 
data is unreliable. 
3.1.2.Consensus security 
A consensus algorithm is a fault-tolerant mechanism at the heart of the blockchain network. 
It specifies how the transactions are validated and enforced. If the consensus algorithm is 
sturdy, the DAPP can rely on the network to be secure. 
If the consensus algorithm is adapted to loosely allow more transactions to be processed in 
a second[26], it can be vulnerable to abuse. While some consensus algorithms are resistant 
to the 51% attack, some are not[27]. Some may also be vulnerable until critical secure node 
mass was reached.  
Critical secure node mass is the minimum number of nodes that have to actively 
communicate on the network in order for it to be resilient to the attacks. It is not an exact 
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number and there is no equation for calculating it. Assessing critical secure mass should 
take into account the sensitivity of data that will be handled by the DAPP as well as the 
complexity of maliciously modifying the blocks that are already included in the blockchain. 
When there are not enough nodes present on the network, an attacker can abuse that and 
overpower the network with malicious chain data. 
When selecting a network to power the DAPP analysis of a risk factor of a chance of this 
abuse has to be estimated. If chain data is reordered in an attack, data used in the DAPP is 
unreliable, since it could be compromised or corrupted. 
The minimum number of nodes to achieve the critical secure mass in public networks is 
higher than in consortium networks. While the public networks require more than a 
thousand legitimate nodes, the consortium networks might require less than ten. Consensus 
mechanism impacts the minimum number of nodes. Proof of Work consensus mechanism 
requires twice to five times the amount of legitimate nodes than Proof of Stake. 
3.2.Secure blockchain network governance 
Decisions about a DAPP can either be performed by the team maintaining and developing 
it, by its users or jointly by the team and the users. This differs from DAPP to DAPP and is 
tied to the use case of the DAPP rather than to its security. 
Governance over the blockchain network powering the DAPP is an important factor when 
choosing the underlying network of the DAPP. If the governance is completely 
decentralized, we can expect that we will have to conform to the majority and their wishes 
and needs; on the other hand, if the governance is completely centralized, we might be 
forced to accept whatever plans the governing entity has in store for the network. 
3.2.1.Public vs. consortium vs. private blockchains 
Public blockchains are the ones anyone can connect to. They are indiscriminate to their user 
base and are usually governed by the majority preference. There is no way to block 
malicious or undesired users and they usually have the most users compared to the other 
two kinds of blockchains. The number of daily active accounts in Ethereum main network 
is over 500,000[28] and the number of daily active accounts in Bitcoin main network is 
over 1,000,000[29].  Governance over the network is done by the majority voting. 
Improvements and changes to the network are usually provided by independent developers 
or development teams and usage of these changes is entirely up to the users of the 
blockchain. If enough users agree with the change, they can start using it and it is 
progressively implemented into the chain. 
Consortium networks are controlled by an organisation or by a consortium of organizations. 
Only the governing body can give the users the ability to use and communicate on a 
consortium network. Due to this kind of networks being limited, the number of daily active 
accounts can be less than 10 or as high as more than 100,000. Any changes to the blockchain 
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network are designed and implemented by the governing body and the users have to use the 
changed blockchain or they are unable to use it. 
Private blockchains are blockchains used for development by a single developer or a 
development team and are not meant to be used as the underlying network of a DAPP. 
3.2.2.Decentralization vs. speed 
Decentralization is one of the key security aspects of blockchain technology. Its downside 
is that with distribution, transaction latency has to be introduced in order to ensure the 
convergence of the blockchain networks in between the blocks. While this mechanic makes 
blockchain networks secure, it decreases the quality of user experience, because the user 
has to wait for some time before the changes contained in their transaction come into effect. 
Implementations of blockchain technology, like EOS[30], tried to resolve this issue with 
user experience by decreasing the factor of decentralization by decreasing distribution of 
the network nodes, which increased the speed of the transactions. This way, more 
transactions can be processed in a shorter amount of time, but the confirmation nodes are 
under the control of the core development team of the blockchain implementation. If the 
team desired to invalidate certain transactions, they could do so. There is also a potential 
for chain data reordering and denial of service to any user deemed undesirable by the core 
team. 
3.3.Smart contract security 
The main feature that blockchains provide is decentralised applications. Since smart 
contracts, which power DAPPs, are executable by design, there are a lot of security aspects 
that need to be covered in order to provide the same level of security that is native to 
blockchain technologies. 
3.3.1.Smart contracts 
Being executable programs triggered by blockchain transactions smart contracts need to be 
developed with an understanding of transaction lifecycle and smart contract execution 
mechanics. Transaction lifecycle has already been discussed in the subchapter 2.2.3. Smart 
contract executable mechanics are sequential. Consensys provides Ethereum smart contract 
best practices guidelines[31] on how to develop the Ethereum smart contracts in order to 
make them as secure as possible.  
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3.3.1.1.Smart contract execution sequence 
The familiarity of smart contract function execution sequence is crucial for secure 
development of smart contracts. 
Figure 3: Smart contract function execution sequence 
Smart contracts use method calls to provide functionalities to the users. When developing 
those methods, we consider them functions. Before a function is executed we can assert 
access or any other permission control by using modifiers. Modifiers are dedicated function 
access controllers that can check numerous conditions in order to determine if the user is 
permitted to execute the function or not. If the user is permitted to execute the function call, 
the sequence of execution continues, otherwise, the transaction that initiated the call is 
reverted including all of the changes that might have already been caused by the transaction 
and the gas fee. This is a fee incurred by computation in the smart contract, that might 
already have been used is returned to the user as well as all of the funds accompanying the 
transaction. 
Once the modifier permits the execution of the function additional, function-specific, 
checks can be included. These function-specific checks can revert the initiating transaction 
in the same manner as the modifiers can. One such check is a check in the implementation 
of the ERC 20[32] standard of non-fungible tokens. It checks if the user has fewer tokens 
after the transaction of the tokens to another account, which is a check for underflow of the 
token balance value. 
As the function-specific checks are passed, the execution of the function logic begins. They 
can include calls of other functions and use their output as data to use in their own operation 
or just require the successful execution of those functions otherwise the initiating 
transaction is reverted. 
After the logic of the function is successfully executed, the function can emit an event to all 
of the nodes that are listening for them. The events usually contain important state changes 
of the stored data contained in the smart contract. 
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Lastly, the function returns a value. This value can be a boolean that notifies the caller of 
successful execution or it could be a value that another function might use for its own 
operation. 
3.3.1.2.Standard implementation 
Parallel to the development of the technology and standards supporting them, the standards 
for the development of smart contracts are being developed. 
Ethereum foundation for example maintains the repository[33] of Ethereum Request for 
Comments (ERCs). ERCs are to the Ethereum network what RFCs[34] are to traditional 
telecommunications. They contain the guidelines on how to implement the node clients to 
be able to communicate within the blockchain networks as well as standardized code 
patterns for certain functionalities of smart contracts. An example of an Ethereum standard 
is the ERC-181[35], which specifies how Ethereum Name Service (ENS) supports reverse 
resolution of Ethereum addresses. 
Having standardized code patterns, allows smart contract developers to build the smart 
contracts that are able to interact with standardized interfaces without having to adapt to 
them or provide specific API endpoints for them to use. 
3.3.1.3.Updating smart contracts 
Contrary to server-based applications, source code of a smart contract cannot be patched or 
updated. This is due to blockchain technology’s immutability characteristic. When a smart 
contract is deployed, it is included in a block and as new blocks are created, the old blocks 
cannot be updated. 
If a smart contract requires an update, the new smart contract has to be deployed. The new 
smart contract can replace the old one to provide the functionality to the DAPP. The old 
smart contract has to be retired and disabled as to not provide another attack vector for our 
DAPP. Stopping smart contracts because there is a newer smart contract available or 
because a critical issue was discovered in the source code of a smart contract is achieved 
by employing Circuit breaker[36] smart contract design pattern. 
3.3.2.Zero-hour vulnerabilities 
Development of any kind of software or technology is vulnerable to zero-hour 
vulnerabilities. Zero-hour vulnerabilities are vulnerabilities that were included in the source 
code of an application, program or technology. Usually, they are not discovered during 
development or testing stages and are present in production environments. 
Attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities and use them to their own advantage. Since the 
vulnerability is unknown it is usually discovered after the attack has been executed and the 
only countermeasure is the mitigation of the damage caused. 
DAPPs have to be developed in a way that is as resilient as possible to such attacks. If the 
vulnerability in the source code exists and finances are siphoned from the smart contract, 
they cannot be recovered, so the methods handling finances have to be extremely resilient 
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and tested as thoroughly as possible. All of the other data can be recovered from the 
blockchain, so if an attack happens and it is discovered, that data can be recovered to a new, 
fixed, smart contract. 
3.3.3.Third party code snippets 
Blockchain technology is in relatively early stages of development and there are not as 
many experienced developers as there are in the other fields. This is resulting in numerous 
developers with mediocre knowledge of blockchain and smart contract development to use 
pre-prepared snippets of code or templates which they slightly modify, to support the use 
case of the smart contract they are developing. Lack of experience and knowledge can result 
in using outdated, flawed or malicious smart contract templates that seem to provide the 
desired functionalities but have built-in vulnerabilities. 
This kind of vulnerability is easy to avoid by writing own smart contracts with correct 
implementations of standardised code patterns and continuous tests to check for the 
expected behaviour of the functions. 
3.3.4.Smart contract Weakness Classification 
Smart contract Weakness Classification (SWC) directory[37] contains all of the 
documented security vulnerabilities that might be contained in the smart contract code and 
the implementation of its methods. Familiarity with SWCs and correct implementations of 
mechanics, documented in them, in smart contracts, is crucial for secure smart contract 
development. 
Before a smart contract is deployed, it should be verified that there are no SWC violations. 
This can be done by one of the SWC validation tools like MythX[38]. 
3.3.5.Secure deployment 
Smart contracts can be deployed in numerous ways. The easiest is to use dedicated 
Integrated Development Environments (IDEs) like Mist[39]. Dedicated IDEs contain built-
in code linting and periodic compilation with syntax error reporting as well as integrated 
deployment track. The issue with that is that the user does not have the control over which 
compiler is being used and this can result in having to use a compiler that has known 
security vulnerabilities. 
Online development environments like Remix[40] are useful since they usually support a 
selection of customizable plugins, some of which include linting, compilation, error 
reporting and deployment capabilities. Usually, they also support the deployment of smart 
contracts with the desired compiler version which means that the user has higher control 
over the secure deployment of the smart contracts. The issue with them is that they require 
a plugin account manager like Metamask in order to sign the transactions. Having one 
introduces a security vulnerability since we have to trust the plugin provider to provide a 
trusted service. 
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Local IDEs like Atom[41] or Visual studio code[42] have plugin packages that can be 
activated by the user. These packages support a range of functionalities like linting, 
compilation, error reporting, security verification and deployment. While these are highly 
modifiable, we have to rely on the developer of every plugin that we are using that there is 
no malicious mechanics included in their source code. 
Deploying smart contracts can also be done in command-line interfaces (CLIs) like 
Terminal on Unix based systems. This option requires the highest level of expertise when 
interacting with a blockchain node. CLI provides users with the highest possible control 
over the deployment of the smart contracts, which, if employed by an experienced user, is 
the most secure way of deploying smart contracts. 
3.3.6.Code reviews 
Code reviews are a standardized practice in software development. A code review is an act 
of reviewing source code for following the agreed-upon code patterns, correct 
implementation of standardized code patterns and for any vulnerabilities that might have 
been introduced by the developer writing the code. It can be done by a co-worker or an 
external experienced developer that is hired for the review. 
Thorough code reviews can discover vulnerabilities in the code so they can be eliminated 
before the code is used in production. This increases the DAPP security. 
3.3.7.Code verification 
Code verification is becoming an industry standard in the field of blockchain smart 
contracts. Since blockchain technology has been developed as open-source technology 
since the early beginning, the same has been adapted to smart contracts. Source code of 
smart contracts is uploaded to publicly available platforms like Etherscan[43], where it is 
compiled and the compiled bytecode is compared to the one stored at the smart contract’s 
address. If they match, the source code is published so every user that wants to can verify 
it. This not only increases the trust in the DAPP but also provides a way for the community 
to discover if there are any vulnerabilities present in the smart contract and notify the 
development team with the request to handle those issues. 
3.4.DAPP interaction security 
Interacting with DAPPs differs from interacting with classic client-server applications in 
that it is not classic HTTP API communication, but the interaction has to include blockchain 
transactions. Since most of today’s application usage is through mobile devices, preparing 
blockchain transactions is a challenge in a rapidly changing blockchain environment, where 
there are no solid standards that we could follow. This is solved by using hybrid 
architectures, where the user interacts with a server which packages blockchain transactions 
for the user or by using applications designed to interact with the desired blockchain and 
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the blockchain application is served as a web application presented through interface 
application's interface. 
3.4.1.Client access to blockchain services 
The easiest way for the end-user to use a DAPP is to use a server-based application that 
communicates with the server, which in turn interacts with the blockchain network and the 
smart contract residing on it. This kind of approach introduces several security issues. The 
server has to store keystore files of the users in order to be able to sign user’s transactions. 
If the keystore files are compromised, the attacker can brute force guess the keys and the 
account is compromised. 
Interaction between the server and the blockchain has to be as secure as blockchain is. We 
have to ensure that the server is not modifying the transactions for any reason and that all 
of the transactions can be audited. 
3.4.2.Multiple blockchains powering DAPPs 
Some DAPPs might benefit from using a combination of public and consortium blockchain 
networks. This introduces the need for a mechanic that allows for a transaction to pass from 
one blockchain to another. These blockchain networks might use a different consensus 
algorithm or transaction format, while still maintaining complete traceability and integrity 
of the transaction. These inter-blockchain transition points are called atomic swaps and will 
be further discussed in chapter 4.5. 
3.4.3.Interface applications 
Interface applications are used to provide users with the ability to interact with a blockchain 
on a device that, in itself, is incapable of such communication. They usually contain a 
blockchain account resources for signing the accounts and connect to a server that is running 
a blockchain node via its API as well as a web browser with support of the web libraries 
required to interact with internet-based DAPPs. 
These applications are developed by teams that don’t necessarily develop DAPPs and are 
more focused on providing the interaction with blockchain to the users. If the users are using 
such applications, they have to trust the development team that the applications are not 
malicious and will never modify their transactions or provide the team with keystore file of 
the user’s account. 
Developers developing DAPPs to be used with interface applications have to take into 
account that users might use insecure interface applications and prepare mechanisms to 
counter any kind of abuse. Providing users with suggestions of what kind of interface 
applications to use is the best practice in such cases. Some of the interface applications are 
Coinbase Wallet[44] and MetaMask[45]. 
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4. DAPP security best practices 
4.1.Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of DAPPs 
The confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) triad is an established information 
security model that can be applied to the blockchain as well. 
Confidentiality stands for ensuring that sensitive information is only accessed by the 
intended entities. Ensuring that sensitive data is not accessed by a third party has to be one 
of the main concerns when developing a service on a blockchain. Since the access to the 
data stored on blockchain is available to every participant in the network, we have to ensure 
that providing the decrypted data to the users is monitored and policed by appropriate access 
control mechanics by the smart contracts if needed. Writing the data to the blockchain is 
comparable to ingress access control list (ACL) on router port in networking and reading 
the data to egress ACL. 
Integrity stands for ensuring that information is not changed when it is propagated through 
the network. This is mostly handled by the blockchain protocol that we are using. At the 
same time, the whole foundation of blockchain is that chained data blocks are connected 
with hashes ensures the integrity of data once it is stored in a block. The most sensitive area 
for data integrity in blockchain development are atomic swaps that are further discussed in 
subchapter 4.5. 
Availability stands for ensuring that data is always available to the entities that have the 
right to use it. Since blockchain consists of numerous nodes that store the chain data, the 
technology itself provides quite a robust foundation for this aspect of the information 
security triad. However, we have to make sure that the blockchain that we are using does 
not have a single point of failure in form of a single or limited number of boot nodes; nodes 
that collect and propagate the information about how to reach other users and entities 
connected to the network, which can be exploited for a denial-of-service (DoS) attack, by 
knocking the boot nodes offline. 
 
4.2.Passive and active smart contract security 
Smart contract security can be divided into two general subsets: active and passive. Active 
smart contract security is any action that ensures confidentiality, integrity or availability 
through active response to the threat that might target any of the three. Passive smart 
security is any action that is taken preventively to ensure any part of the CIA trio. 
Active smart contract security might be actively monitoring incoming smart contract 
transactions and verifying their legitimacy and blocking them before they can cause any 
harm[46]. While this might provide some level of security, it is in no way a replacement for 
passive means of security and should only be used as another security layer. 
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Passive smart contract security has been discussed in detail in subchapter 3.3. It entails 
everything from smart contract architecture, to hybrid technology architecture, to the way 
multiple blockchains or blockchains and servers interact with each other, to the proper 
assessment of blockchain networks and the service we want to use them for. 
4.3.Multi-contract environment 
As it is with every service providing application, source code is usually split into modules. 
These modules are easier to handle and navigate than all of the lines of code contained in a 
single file. 
At the beginning of smart contract development, most of the smart contracts were a single 
file source code to be run on blockchain as a whole backend of a DAPP. While that satisfied 
the demands of the users, it resulted in most of the decentralized applications to be 
unmanageable when the requirement for updates arose. 
4.3.1.Single-contract environment 
Single smart contract architecture is useful when we have a small blockchain-based service. 
Since there is only one smart contract, access control to the resources and functions it 
provides can be easily managed by the service provider. Once the smart contract needs to 
be updated, the original smart contract has to be rendered unusable, usually by disabling 
any transactions to it, and, in a best-practice scenario, a new smart contract address is stored 
at the original one’s address, so that users can easily find the new one. 
Maintaining and managing rudimentary smart contracts is simple, but as the service grows 
and the source code expands into multiple distinguishable modules, the smart contract 
becomes more complex and security vulnerabilities can start to appear, despite regular code 
reviews. 
4.3.2.Multi-contract environment 
Multiple smart contracts working together to provide a single decentralized service can be 
very complex to implement compared to single smart contract architectures. The service 
architecture has to be carefully thought out and modules clearly defined. 
Using multiple smart contracts introduces inter-smart contract calls that can introduce 
additional expenses when using the service. Despite those expenses, the code base is more 
manageable and, in conjunction with regular code reviews, can be more resilient to security 
vulnerabilities. 
Since there are now multiple smart contracts that have to work together, the security and 
access policy have to be carefully designed and planned. It also makes sense to have a single 
smart contract that handles interaction permissions for all of the smart contracts. This means 
that all of the security is centralised and offers a better overview than having access and 
security policies defined in every smart contract that comprises the multi-contract 
architecture. 
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If we have tokenized assets, one smart contract can now handle the tokenized assets, while 
the other one provides service that the tokenized assets are used for. Tokenized assets are 
assets, which can be digital collectables or a part of a company, represented by a 
standardized token, like ERC 20 or ERC 721[47] tokens. 
The bigger the code base gets, the more sense it makes to have a multi-contract architecture 
and greater the security benefits to the service become. 
4.3.2.1.EIP-2535: Diamond standard 
Ethereum Improvement Proposal (EIP) 2535[48] with codename Diamond standard, is an 
improvement proposal on how to implement multi smart contract solution. It proposes using 
a central smart contract, called Diamond, which has support for adding and removing the 
external functions of the smart contracts that implement the logic of the service. Functions 
of those logic smart contracts are called Facets. Facets can share state and functionality and 
they can be reused and discarded if necessary. Shared Faces storage is contained in the 
Diamond. 
Diamond standard extensively documents the proposal of an upgradeable multi smart 
contract environment but it does not include any security mechanics that would provide 
secure and reliable inter smart contract interactions. 
4.4.Hybrid blockchain - server architecture 
Due to the current performance limitations of blockchain technology, it is sensible to 
consider using hybrid architecture to support services utilizing it. Hybrid architecture can 
use standard servers in addition to the blockchain part or two complementary blockchains, 
each with its own advantages and drawbacks. 
4.4.1.Off-chain to on-chain architecture 
Using the blockchain server architecture allows us to store storage-intensive data like 
images and videos to servers in order to not over-bloat the chain size. This also enables us 
to focus on the security aspects of the smart contract and not spread our focus on how to 
store data that requires more storage than one blockchain’s block allows us to store in one 
turn. 
On the other hand, we can validate storage-heavy items in the smart contract, securing them 
as well as utilizing, any business logic that might need them. 
Having this kind of architecture requires the service provider to have a single or multiple 
blockchain edge nodes that provide communication between the smart contract and the 
server-hosted backend code. They also have to be secure enough to be trusted. This means 
that they have to be approved in the smart contract as a special kind of user as well as, in 
case of using multiple nodes, each has their own account or address. Having separate 
addresses for each of the nodes allows the service provider to identify any node that might 
have been compromised and hot-swap the account it is using, without disrupting the service. 




Smart contracts are unable to directly access or use any data that is not available in the 
blockchain or passed to them by transactions, because blockchain execution environments, 
like Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), deterministic in a sense that no matter when the 
smart contract is executed, the result of the execution is the same. If the same thing happens 
on a server that utilizes the changeable information from the Internet, the behaviour is 
unpredictable. If a smart contract requires data that is not available on the chain to provide 
its service, it can employ the service of an oracle. Oracles are server-based solutions that 
provide smart contracts with real-world data. Implementations have to be carefully 
designed, thoroughly tested and reliable in order to provide the same level of security that 
is inherent to a blockchain network. 
4.5.Inter-chain interaction - Atomic swaps 
Considering the diversity of different blockchains, coupled with their advantages and 
disadvantages, some cases benefit from the multi-blockchain architecture. Using different 
blockchain technologies to enhance various levels of service business logic also introduces 
a whole new level of security vulnerabilities we have to address. Blockchain technology 
implementations utilise various consensus protocols in order to support different transaction 
throughputs, block sizes or level of service security. 
Having a higher transaction throughput for handling business logic usually means a trade-
off in chain data integrity. Slightly lower transaction throughput results in much higher 
security standards for monetary transactions. 
While each chain handling its own side of business logic is trivial, having the chains 
communicate with each other and maintain the same level of integrity and security as with 
single-chain architecture poses an issue. For that kind of communication, we require atomic 
swaps. 
As mentioned in the subchapter 4.4, one of the possible service architectures includes 
interaction between two or more different blockchains. Since different blockchains provide 
different classes of nodes to access and use their networks, the interaction point has to be 
able to support both or multiple of them and therefore has the capability of translating data 
from one blockchain to the other.  
Having to communicate on two different blockchains poses a variety of challenges. Firstly, 
there is an issue of trust; the demarcation point in which the transition of data between the 
blockchains happens has to be trusted not to modify the data it is transmitting. 
Confidentiality is also a big issue. Data that passes through atomic swap has to somehow 
be transferred from one chain to the other but must not be read or accessed at the 
demarcation point in some other way. Since most blockchains use accounts to track the 
ownership of assets and information, a mechanic that preserves this kind of ownership 
traceability has to be implemented. 




Trust assurance might be one of the hardest atomic swap issues to solve. Since atomic swap 
itself can be implemented as a single ingress-egress point between blockchains in service, 
they can be abused for malicious actions. 
One way of solving this issue might be to open source the code that is used in the atomic 
swap action. But since the atomic swap is still run by the service provider, the production 
code could differ from the one accessible to the public. This is why enabling multiple atomic 
swaps to run by the community using the service provider’s open-source code might 
increase trust in them. 
Following guidelines outlined in subchapters 4.5.2, 4.5.3, and 4.5.4, might also increase 
trust in the atomic swap that the service is using. 
4.5.2.Integrity issue 
In every instance of using an intermediary, there arises an issue of integrity of the data 
transferred. While the doubt about data integrity could be avoided by checking the data on 
both chains, that could prove to be more of a burden, than the value of the action. Instead 
of double-checking the transferred data, atomic swaps can utilize hashes on both chains. 
Every outgoing data is hashed by the outbound entity (e.g., smart contract) and then again 
by the inbound entity. Hashing can be done in multiple manners. One is the combination of 
data that is being transferred and originating block number or hash. This way, there can 
theoretically be only one possible hash of the data and therefore the data verification can be 
automated. Another approach to data hashing is by a community word that is known to the 
smart contracts on both chains but not by the atomic swap. This way, the hash can’t be 
successfully modified with malicious intent. In case of transferring the data using hash 
integrity verification, the hash has to be transferred as well in order to be verified against 
re-hashed data on the receiving blockchain. 
Having a dedicated smarty contract on both blockchains, that handles provided hashes of 
the transferred data on both sides, could further simplify the process of atomic swap 
integrity verification. The smart contract ingress data is the data to be transferred via the 
atomic swap. The target address on the other chain, transaction instruction (function call) 
and data hash, while the visible data for verification would only be the atomic swap 
transaction identifier. The atomic swap transaction identifier is not to be confused with the 
blockchain transaction identifier, and the hash of the transferred data. 
4.5.3.Confidentiality issue 
Even after the data integrity issue is solved, the data confidentiality issue has to be solved. 
While one of the most important mechanics of every blockchain is that data is securely 
stored, transferring such data without translating it back to the readable and useful format 
is crucial for interchain usability of it. 
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If data passing through the atomic swap is converted into plain text, anyone with access to 
the atomic swap itself is able to access and read it. Since data confidentiality is one of the 
fundamentals of telecommunications, we have to ensure it. 
The most intuitive way of ensuring it is by transmitting encoded data using passwords or 
passphrases before sending it to the blockchain. That might pose to be a bigger issue than 
it is at the first glance. Blockchain processing in public networks is quite expensive and 
since the best practice of handling completely separate sets of actions is to have multiple 
interoperable smart contracts, the transaction fees might be very high. This is why such a 
way of ensuring data confidentiality, while the most secure option, might be too expensive 
for some of the less sensitive data. 
Another way of ensuring the confidentiality of transferred data is to have it transferred in a 
single logical unit of work. Meaning, that once data enters an atomic swap it is directly 
routed to the target smart contract on another chain, without allowing any access or 
processing of data itself by the atomic swap. This option might be more suitable for the data 
of less sensitive nature. 
4.5.4.Ownership traceability issue 
Most of the blockchain families use their own mechanism of creating the addresses and 
validating ownership over that address. Therefore, there is no assurance that the same 
address belongs to the same entity on multiple blockchains or even that the same address 
exists on both blockchains that are communicating over the atomic swap. 
Since the ownership of the data or assets has to be tracked somehow in order to be able to 
enforce governance over it, there has to be a mechanism implemented that handles inter-
chain ownership tracking of the aforementioned assets. 
We propose a mechanic called Address Resolution Service (ARS); a service that maps an 
address belonging to a certain entity to the address that belongs to the same entity on another 
network. The service would have to support verification from both networks and enable 
access to it from both networks. This could be done by having identically working smart 
contracts on both blockchains or by some other atomic swap mechanic. The implementation 
of the ARS could be executed by the DAPP developer using the service but implementing 
it as a self-standing service, agnostic form the use case would increase the integrity and 
trust into it. A self-standing ARS could increase trust because it would not have an incentive 
to modify the transactions in favour of the DAPP development team. 
4.6.Load prediction and testing 
Selecting the right blockchain network for a service is crucial for decentralized applications. 
While there are many publicly available networks with more or less information about their 
operation available, it is still important to identify the points of failure and bottlenecks of 
the blockchain that we are going to use. Otherwise, the network might get congested and, 
in some extreme cases, even unusable for a while (CryptoKitties[49]). 
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4.6.1.Types of testing 
There are many different possible approaches to testing blockchain networks. When testing 
a network that would support a service that might quickly expand to support a great number 
of users, we have to test how the network handles increased transaction number load. If we 
only want to optimize transaction handling, the thing to do is to adapt parameters of an 
existing blockchain. Every test has to be analysed with network analysers, which differ 
based on the parameters that we are observing. 
4.6.2.Load generators 
Load generators are network stressing tools that simulate network traffic by sending 
transactions in predefined patterns. The patterns can be periodical or random bursts of 
transactions or a steady stream of a predefined number of transactions per second. They can 
provide quite a clear picture of how the network responds to the real users sending 
transactions when using the service. One such Ethereum network load generator was built 
in the Laboratory of telecommunications of Faculty of Electrical Engineering at the 
University of Ljubljana as an internal resource to test our consortium networks. 
4.6.3.Parameter testing 
Most of the blockchain families use genesis blocks in which defining parameters of the 
blockchain are stored. These parameters influence the transaction per second 
characteristics, block sizes, transaction confirmation mechanics and more. Some 
blockchains support adjusting these parameters on the live network without hard forks; e.g. 
Hyperledger Sawtooth[50]. 
When deciding on using blockchain as the underlying technology for the service, it is 
sensible to consider part of the service to be run on a private blockchain network. This gives 
the service provider the ability to adjust the parameters of the blockchain in a way that 
optimizes the service. 
After identifying the parameters that are sensible to be experimented upon, a load generator 
can be used in order to stress-test the current setting of the network. By adjusting the 
parameters and periodically running the load generators, the network can be optimised. In 
a sense, we can consider this a gradient method of adjusting the parameters for private 
blockchain network optimization. 
4.6.4.Network analysers 
Currently, every major blockchain has some sort of a network inspector tool. These tools 
are meant to provide some oversight over the state of the networks. They provide 
information about the most recent blocks, the transactions that are stored within them and 
other information about the state of the network. Network inspector for Ethereum network 
is etherscan.io[43] and Blockchain network has btc.com[51]. If we want to analyse a 
network and how it impacts our service or smart contract, we need special and more detailed 
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metrics than those tools can provide. We need a network analyser that keeps track of 
transaction latency, the number of transactions that are buffered in the transaction pools 
before they are confirmed and the ability of the network to successfully resume nominal 
operation after congestion has occurred. 
Such tools have to be built from scratch since none are currently available. They can work 
as self-standing tools that passively collect information about the network by listening for 
new transactions and then tracking them until they are successfully added to a block or 
active tools that generate their own transactions and then track the status of the network. 
Active network analysers would have a load generator component built-in. 
4.6.5.Network simulators 
Network simulators are tools that simulate the deployed and active network with simulated 
users interacting on it. They require extensive knowledge about the network and how it 
behaves under low, moderate and high load of transactions. The tools mentioned before; 
like network analysers and load generators are used to collect information about the network 
and are crucial to a realistic simulation of a live network. 
The simulators can be used to test how the network would impact and handle the service 
we want to deploy on it. The resulting simulation should give us a sufficiently mature state 
of the network in relation to the service, so we can fairly certainly decide whether or not we 
will deploy it on this blockchain. 
The most used Ethereum network simulator is Ganache[52], which is also used to spin up 
the disposable private networks for the development of smart contracts and testing. 
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5. Swether - from rudimentary DAPP to secure, scalable 
and reliable service 
5.1.General Swether overview 
Swether is a smart electrical charging switch on Ethereum. It is an electrical charging 
solution that utilizes Ethereum smart contracts to provide a platform for users to charge 
their devices on the charging stations that charging station owners provide. The platform 
began developing in 2016 at the Laboratory of Telecommunications of the Faculty of 
Electrical Engineering (LTFE) of University of Ljubljana. 
The mission of Swether is to provide a secure charging platform that is agnostic to the kind 
of charging that is being provided. Electrical car charging of any other electrical device 
charging can be provided through this universal platform. 
5.1.1.Existing Swether use cases 
Throughout the development of Swether, there were different applications of the solution 
through which we explored different mechanics that could benefit the platform. 
The first use case we developed was an electric vehicle charging station powered by 
Swether. The charging users could book the charging plugs on various charging stations 
and pay for charging. Charging station owners could register and manage their charging 
stations and the plugs on them. We supported multi-charging stations, multi-plug, multi-
owner solutions into which we incorporated rewarding charging service customers with 
ERC-20 standardized loyalty tokens. 
A Christmas tree with lights that users could turn on using a Swether smart switch was a 
showcase that helped educate the students of the Faculty of Electrical Engineering in 
Ljubljana about how blockchain technology works and what it is capable of. It was also 
featured in an international article[53] as one of the successful festive projects built on 
blockchain. 
Mobile device charging is the latest use case powered by Swether. It enables the users to 
charge up their devices on the go. It supports shorter charging times and friendlier user 
interface with the streamlined smart contract to support charging on the go as well as 
provide more information about what is going on in the blockchain because it is meant to 
educate the charging service customers about the solution as well as technology. 
5.2.Swether v 0.x 
The development of Swether began in December of 2016 of Ethereum development. It was 
a simple single-smart contract DAPP that allowed booking of charging plugs to the charging 
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station users. Through time it evolved and started supporting more and more features that 
were gradually introduced into the same smart contract. 
The continuous growth of the smart contract progressively introduced increasing 
complexity to the development, maintaining and keeping the smart contract secure. The 
smart contract consisted of multiple modules; administrative, loyalty and charging service 
modules. The modules interacted with each other to provide full functionality of Swether 
but were proving harder and harder to improve upon. 
As the codebase grew, the smart contract source code was 325 lines with a substantial 
amount of similarly named variables and methods which resulted in difficult code 
navigation and confusion when using the smart contract’s API. 
The smart contract is written in Solidity version 0.4.18 which received multiple security 
and functionality updates to the day of writing; as of now, the latest version of Solidity is 
0.7.1. 
Since Swether was built as a proof-of-concept solution, there were no mechanics 
implemented for migration and outdated smart contracts were abandoned and replaced with 
new ones without any migration mechanics. The edge cases that could occur during the 
operation were mostly covered, but if one occurred, the patched version of the smart 
contract was deployed, and the user interface redirected to it. All of the data stored in the 
previous version of the smart contract had to be manually re-entered, even the operation-
critical ones.  
5.2.1.Used technologies in Swether v 0.x 
Swether showcase currently consists of Solidity smart contract backend, a rudimentary 
web-based application built with Vue.js[54] and web3.js[55] libraries. Infura[56] provider 
is used as a gateway between the web interface and a smart contract as well as a smart 
contract and hardware. Hardware is built with custom PCB controlled by RaspberryPi 
3[57]. 
The smart contracts are deployed on Ropsten[58] Ethereum public testnet. Ethereum's main 
network is unnecessary since this is a proof-of-concept solution and is not used in 
production. 




Figure 4: Screenshot of Swether user interface[59] 
5.2.2.General overview of Swether v 0.x implementation 
The smart contract uses ERC 20 standard for loyalty tokens and adheres to best practices 
outlined in Solidity version 0.4.18. ERC 190[60]  is a smart contract packaging standard. It 
specifies how source code of a Solidity project is supposed to be packaged in order for the 
project to be properly tested, deployed and documented. While ERC 190was already 
defined while the project was going through various iterations, it was not implemented, due 
to the small scale of the project. If the project consisted of more intricate user interfaces and 
broader smart contract spectre, then it would make sense to implement it. Current code 
organization of single smart contract backend and two user-facing interfaces; charging 
station user and administrative one, do not require such structure. 
Infura Ethereum gateway is used to interact with the smart contract because this alleviates 
the need for us to run our own full node and maintain it, to provide always-on functionality 
of the platform. Another reason for using Infura is to be able to use Raspberry Pi 3 at the 
heart of our platform. Expanding the microcontroller’s storage to accommodate for the full 
chain data of Ethereum blockchain would result in excessive power usage. Alternatively, 
we could run an independent full node, which would provide connectivity between 
Ethereum and RaspberryPi, but using Infura, which is thoroughly reviewed and battle-
tested, provides for a more secure way of interaction. 
Using Raspberry Pi 3 enables us to rapidly prototype by reprogramming the microcontroller 
or connecting a new PCB that provides charging. It also enables us for quicker updates of 
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the hardware’s programming and firmware if that proves necessary. This also makes 
Swether both lightweight and powerful at the same time. 
Vue.js allows us to build simple but appealing user interfaces that use Material design[61] 
and are easy to navigate. Web3.js is an Ethereum foundation-supported library for 
interacting with decentralized applications in the browser. 
5.2.3.Smart contract overview of Swether v 0.x implementation 
While Swether is a single smart contract solution, it is still a multi-tenant solution. It 
supports four levels of tenants with an additional sub-level of tenants. The administration 
is handled by the owner, that is the highest authority in the platform, and the administrators, 
that are tier two authority of the platform. The third level of tenants is charging station 
owners, who have the ability to administer their charging stations and modify their own 
information. Charging station owners also have a sub-level of tenants, which are their 
charging stations, that have the ability to update their availability status. The last level of 
supported tenants is charging service customers. They are not registered and can only use 
the platform for viewing the information about the charging stations and book charging. 
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Figure 5: Representation of how multi tenancy implemented in Swether 
Figure 5 shows that there is only one owner that is allowed to administer all levels of 
registered tenants (administrators and charging station owners). There can be multiple 
administrators that administer charging station owners, which in turn can administer their 
charging stations. Charging service customers interact with charging stations to view their 
information and book charging. The latter are unregistered. 
Multiple methods are defined to support the diverse actions provided by Swether platform. 
They support the administrative CRUD actions[62], loyalty related actions and charging 
related actions. List of these methods, their corresponding module, purpose and 
administrative level required to use them can be found in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Methods present in Swether legacy smart contract 
 
Method name Method module Method purpose Required 
administrative 
level 
transferOwnership administrative Transfer the owner 
administrative level 
to another account 
owner 
promoteToAdmin administrative Manage the 
administrator level 
permissions of the 
account 
owner 
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provisionOwner administrative Manage registration 
status of charging 
station owners 
owner, administrator 
registerCS administrative Manage registration 




transfer loyalty Transfer 
accumulated loyalty 
tokens from own 






transferFrom loyalty Transfer 
accumulated tokens 
from one address to 
another if the first 
account’s 
credentials were lost 
owner 









setPrice charging service Sets the price of 
charging per time 




charging service Sets the time the 
charging station 
waits before it starts 
charging after it 
receives the event to 
start charging 
owner, administrator 
setPricePerKWh charging service Sets the price of 
charging per unit of 
electrical power 
used in charging 
owner, administrator 
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setUserSwapTime charging service Sets the time the 
charging station 
waits between two 
chargings in order to 
ensure the charging 





charging service Sets the minimum 
amount of time the 
user can book 
charging for  
owner, administrator 
setPlugNumber charging service Sets the number of 
plugs available for 
charging (this is a 
helper method for 
ease of 
configuration of 
web user interface) 
owner, administrator 
retrieveFunds charging service Extracts available 
Ether form smart 
contract account 
owner 
weiToSeconds charging service Calculates the 
charging time that 
certain amount of 






secondsToWei charging service Calculates the 
required amount of 
wei to get the 
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maxWeiToSeconds charging service Calculates the 
charging time that 
certain amount of 
wei would provide 
while considering 
the different power 






maxSecondsToWei charging service Calculates the 
maximum required 
amount of wei to get 
the desired duration 
of charging while 
considering the 







registerAPlug charging service Adds a charging 
plug to the charging 
station and thus 
makes it available 





modifyAPlug charging service Modifies the 
information about 





charging service Transfers the 
ownership of 





bookAPlug charging service Books a charging 
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plugIsFree charging service After charging is 
complete signals 
that the charging 





As you can see in table 1, there are many required methods present in Swether to provide 
charging service. Even the shortest and simplest way to book a plug for charging requires 
numerous steps to occur before it is possible. 
 
Figure 6: Basic charging operation 
First, the owner has to appoint an administrator which in turn needs to register a charging 
station owner. Then the charging station owner has to add their charging station and 
charging station plug information. After the charging station and its corresponding plug are 
present in the smart contract, the administrator has to set the charging price, set the time the 
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charging station waits after receiving the booking to start charging, set the price per unit of 
charging power, set the time the charging station remains in-operational after the charging 
is completed, set the minimum booking time of charging to prevent a denial of service attack 
and the number of plugs currently present on the platform, so the user interface knows how 
to render. 
After all of these steps are completed the charging service customer can finally book the 
charging plug and charge their device. The important thing to note is that every step that is 
described is its own blockchain transaction, which means that with the average time of 
Ethereum blockchain transaction time of 12 seconds, the setup phase after the deploy of the 
smart contract and before the charging service customer is able to book a plug takes at least 
2 minutes, provided that transactions are executed one after the other and that there is no 
congestion in the network. Although this is the initial setup and needs to be completed only 
after the smart contract is deployed, each step has liability for error and even if one of these 
transactions contains an error, the smart contract has to be redeployed. Every change or 
update to the smart contract also requires all of these setup steps to be completed. Taking 
into account how big of a security risk this is and the downtime of a Dapp, if the new smart 
contract contains a bug fix is considerable and amounts to a bad user experience. 
5.3.Designing Swether v 1.x 
As indicated in the subchapter 5.2, the design of the whole Swether platform has to be re-
examined and applied in order to provide enhanced security of the platform as well as the 
resulting optimized performance. 
5.3.1.Identifying Swether v 0.x open issues 
Numerous iterations of maintenance of legacy codebase of the Swether platform led to the 
introduction of various issues, including outdated source code, redundant methods, insecure 
built-in features of Solidity and more. The initial project was not planned to reach such 
magnitude and while the source code has been documented to some extent, the 
documentation is not unified and is lacking in certain areas. Lack of documentation resulted 
in redundant methods, which only slightly differed amongst themselves. 
5.3.1.1.Identification and analysis of Swether v 0.x shortcomings 
Initially, the Swether project was designed to be a short-term pilot project. Thus, it has never 
been designed to be updated. No mechanics were implemented to update the smart contract 
to provide continuous service without any downtime when the smart contract source code 
is updated. 
As we added more and more functionalities, which were not separated into self-contained 
modules, but rather integrated into the source code. Instead of using multiple interacting 
smart contracts, we were bloating a single-smart contract solution. 
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Various functionalities require different levels of access and different tenants to have those 
access levels. Having a single administrative module prevented us from doing that and 
forced us to rigidly assign administrative access throughout the platform. 
Introduction of additional functionalities to the smart contract could render the smart 
contract undeployable. This would be a result of a higher gas requirement for the smart 
contract deployment than there is a limit of gas permitted to be spent for a single block. 
Some of the smart contract mechanics are built to conform to the user interface limitations 
and should not be present in a working prototype. That is the rigid amount of charging plugs 
supported by the platform which was dictated by the user interface’s limit of the amount of 
charging plugs present to the user without overflowing the screen. 
5.3.1.2.Possible improvements 
As indicated in the subchapter 5.3.1.1 there are multiple fields due for improvement. 
Since one of the biggest shortcomings of the initial Swether platform is its inability to be 
updated without causing downtime of the service, the new version should be designed with 
upgradeability in mind. 
The second field of improvement is modularity. Instead of using a single smart contract to 
provide the functionality of our platform, multiple smart contracts dedicated each to its own 
functionality and interacting and interoperating to provide an enhanced platform from what 
it initially was. 
Solving the issue with segregating administrative access to modules rather than to the whole 
platform, can be solved by distributing modules into multiple module-grade smart contracts 
as described in the previous paragraph. Having an administrative module smart contract 
that provides administration to each module independently from the other allows for much 
more precise and tailored administrative access control of the modules. 
Lastly, the smart contracts should not conform to the user interface but provide the 




The platform has to be separated into clear modules with clear tenants that have permission 
to interact with each module. 
Modules should be extracted from the original platform or derived from it to provide 
enhanced functionality compared to the Swether v 0.x. 
Tenants should also conform to the tenants from Swether v 0.x, but their level of access 
should be modified and restricted to modules of their residence. 




A legacy platform had a few modules that can be straightforwardly extracted. 
Administration module manages access to the methods provided by the platform. Loyalty 
module provides ERC 20 standardized tokens to award continuous use of the platform. 
Charging module is the heart of the platform and provides methods required for managing 
charging stations and owner’s data and provide charging service to users of the platform. 
Distributing modules into multiple smart contracts requires the smart contracts to be able to 
interoperate and subsequently requires the other module’s Ethereum address in order to 
interact with it. This can be accomplished by manually extracting addresses from each 
module and entering it into another module’s storage in order to enable interactions between 
them. It would provide administrative overhead for an administrator of the module and 
would require 2*n (where n is the number of modules) number of interactions with modules 
to achieve continuous operation of the platform when a module is updated. Introduction of 
a new module that would provide an interface to share addresses of the module’s smart 
contracts would automate the dissemination of addresses and decrease the module 
interaction from 2*n to 1. This module shall be named Smart contract directory. 
Since we have multiple modules distributed into smart contracts, we want to have a single 
point of interaction for all of our tenants. This module should not have any logic 
implemented on its own but should just be used for interaction with the other modules. 
Since it represents the core of the platform that allows all of the tenants to interact with it, 
it shall be called Core module. 
The charging station data, their plugs and their availability still need to be tracked in a 
unified module. This module should contain all of the necessary methods and logic needed 
to add and administer charging stations and the related data. It is a directory of charging 
stations and data related to them and shall be named Charging station directory. 
We are dealing with monetary transactions related to the payment of charging service. To 
ensure the maximum available safety and integrity of the service, we require an additional 
module that ensures there are no maliciously advertised charging stations that would not 
deliver charging when they receive payment. At the same time, we want to ensure that the 
charging service providers get paid for the service they provide and not be left unpaid after 
the service is completed. This is the reason for implementing the Escrow module, which 
provides escrow services for the platform. 
Additionally, the Accumulator module is implemented. This module intends to accumulate 
the funds the charging station owner’s charging stations have earned and can be extracted 
at charging station owner’s leisure instead of continuously transacting funds to the charging 
station owner’s address as soon as the escrow tied to their charging station is completed. 
5.3.2.3.Module classification 
Comparing the modules identified in the subchapter 5.3.2.2, three clear groupings, based 
on the necessity of the modules in Swether platform as well as their applicability to other 
solutions, are emerging. 
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The first group of modules is needed in most of the multi smart contract environments. The 
modules contained in it are built to support the operation of the platform and are not 
intended to provide any service-specific logic. Since this group of modules is independent 
of the platform and can be used in any number of solutions the name Platform agnostic 
seems appropriate for the group. Modules that fall into this category are the Administration 
module and Smart contract directory module. 
The second group of modules is closely tied to the platform and contains the modules that 
contain all of the methods that are essential to the solution. Without these modules, the 
platform would not be able to provide any service to its users. Since this group of modules 
is so closely tied to the platform, the name Platform specific seems apt. Modules that qualify 
into this category are Charging station directory and Core module. 
The last group of modules provides additional value to the platform but is not essential for 
providing the users with the bare-bone minimum of the service. Since these modules are 
the ones that provide additional value, this group shall be called the Auxiliary group. 
Modules that belong to it are the Escrow module, Loyalty module and Accumulator module. 
Auxiliary group modules can be applied to a number of solutions, but their role, in most 
cases, is not as critical as the Platform agnostic and Platform specific groups of modules. 
Figure 7: Graphic representation of module classification 
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5.3.2.4.Inter module interactions 
As mentioned in the Module Identification subchapter the heart of the platform is the Core 
module. It is used to perform all of the interactions connected to the platform and has to be 
able to interact with all of the other modules to pass the appropriate method calls to them. 
The administration module is used to provide access control for the method calls of every 
module and has to interact with each of them through its own API. 
Smart contract directory module makes sure that the modules are able to find each other’s 
addresses, and consequently interact with each other it provides the API calls to ensure that 
this kind of interaction runs smoothly. 
Charging station directory module is the one providing the essential logic to the Swether 
platform. It interacts with the Platform agnostic modules and the Accumulator and Escrow 
modules. Note that it does not interact with the Loyalty module, since there is no need for 
that interaction. 
Escrow module interacts with Charging station directory and Core to be able to provide 
escrow services and get the approvals about the completion of the escrow conditions. It also 
interacts with the Loyalty module to assign enough of the loyalty tokens to the user when 
the escrow is completed and with Accumulator to transfer the escrowed funds to the 
Accumulator for the beneficiary to collect. 
Accumulator module interacts with the Charging station directory to get the information 
necessary to provide the service to the charging station owners. The interaction with the 
Core module allows the fund to be retrieved from the Accumulator. 




Figure 8: Graphic representation of module interactions 
5.3.2.5.Smart contract tunnelling 
As can be seen in Figure 8, there is a complex web of interactions between the platform’s 
modules. This introduces a challenge of careful planning of how each interaction flows 
from ingress to the end result of the method, but such planning has always been a 
requirement in software development. 
In the common smart contract development, where the user interacts directly with the smart 
contract, the access control is enforced using the native transaction’s msg.sender value. This 
kind of access control enforcement is very robust since it ensures that the transaction 
originated from the sender that we authorized to interact with the smart contract and has not 
been intercepted by a malicious smart contract and redirected to the target smart contract 
with malicious intent. 
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Figure 9: Representation of msg.sender value modification when transaction passes through the 
network 
As Figure 9 shows, every time the transaction passes through a smart contract, the 
msg.sender value of the transaction is modified to represent the last address of the account 
that interacted with the transaction. This is analogous to MAC addresses in TCP/IP 
communication, where the MAC address of the frame represents the last interface that the 
frames passed through. 
When enforcing the access control in the multi smart contract environment, we want to 
assign access permissions in the individual smart contract, not only in a single smart 
contract that passes the method calls to the others. This can be achieved with the tx.origin 
value of the transaction. This value is analogous to the source IP address of the IP packet in 
the TCP/IP stack. 
Using tx.origin value as an access control parameter is dangerous since a malicious smart 
contract with seemingly harmless methods could modify the transaction and send it to target 
smart contract and do as much harm as the tx.origin address is permitted. This is described 
and documented in SWC-115[63].  
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Figure 10: Representation of immutability of tx.origin of the transaction from origin of the transaction 
until final destination 
As the figures 9 and 10 indicate, the access control using msg.sender would defeat multi 
smart contract architecture of the platform that uses a single smart contract as the interface 
for all of the others. Access control using only tx.origin introduces a major security 
vulnerability since any smart contract can be programmed in a way to attack any of our 
modules and render them inoperable or do irreversible damage. 
Design of the access control has to be rethought in a way that takes both of the 
vulnerabilities into account, yet still delivers a multi smart contract secure solution. Since 
we have a Smart contract directory module, we can verify that the method call passed 
through an authorized module and that it originated from a permitted account. 
Using both, the tx.origin value to verify that the transaction originated from an authorized 
source and msg.sender value to verify that the transaction was forwarded from an authorized 
source, allows us to enforce the access control within multi smart contract environments 
using virtual access control tunnels. We call this method Smart Contract Tunnelling 
(SCT)[64].  
46 Swether - from rudimentary DAPP to secure, scalable and reliable service 
 
 
Figure 11: Smart contract tunnel representation 
As it can be seen in Figure 11, the smart contract tunnel is established by specifying the 
per-user access permission level in the target smart contract, while we also specify the smart 
contract that is allowed to forward the transaction to its final destination. Since msg.sender 
and tx.origin values cannot be falsified, we have established a secure tunnel for the user to 
communicate with the target smart contract without having to know its address. This also 
allows us to chain the interactions between transactions and enables us to verify that every 
step of the transaction is permitted to the user. 
Figure 12: Detection of malicious transactions powered by Smart Contract Tunnelling 
Figure 12 shows how the SCT is able to detect malicious transactions and prevent the tunnel 
establishment. This way any actions triggered by this malicious transaction will be reverted 
to the pre-transaction state and our platform will keep its integrity of data.  
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Figure 13: Smart Contract Tunnelling logic flowchart 
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Figure 13 represents the logic that supports the Smart Contract Tunnelling (SCT). SCT 
introduces complex logic to ensure the security of user communication in a multi smart 
contract environment. When the user calls the desired method, they are unaware of which 
module the method resides in. The initial transaction is sent to an interface smart contract, 
which uses Smart contract directory to forward the transaction towards the target module. 
As the transaction is forwarded to the target module smart contract through a smart contract 
tunnel, the origin of the transaction as well as the last module through which the transaction 
passed, are the ones ensuring that the transaction is legitimate. The target module checks, if 
the user that tried to call the method, is allowed to call it and that the module that forwarded 
the transaction is allowed to forward this particular call. Only if both are true, then the 
method is executed. If either is false, then the transaction is reverted and all of the changes 
that might have occurred, are reverted to the pre-transaction state. 
Snippet 1: Administration module implementation of registered user check 
Snippet 2: Module registered user check when using smart contract tunnelling 
Snippet 1 and 2 are examples of how Smart contract tunnelling registered user verification 
is implemented. Administration module provides each module with its own repository of 
registered users, which only that module can access and modify. That mechanic is used 
when a method is called that requires the caller to be a registered user of the module. Since 
a proxy module is used to access the module, the tx.origin value has to match the registered 
user. At the same time, the proxy of the transaction has to be verified in order to ensure, 
that the tunnel is originating from a valid source. This is achieved by verifying that the 
msg.sender value equals the Core module. If both conditions are met, the method gets 
executed, otherwise, the changes resulting from the transaction, are reverted. 
5.3.2.6.Tenant planning 
New multi-module environment now allows us to have tenants defined in more detail. 
Although they all interact with various modules using the interface smart contract, they are 
allowed to call some methods, while the other methods are forbidden to them. 
 1 modifier onlyRegisteredUser{ 
 2   require( 
 3    (admin.checkRegisteredUser(tx.origin) && 
 4     msg.sender == Core) 
 5    ); 
 6    _; 
 7  } 
 1 function checkRegisteredUser(address _registeredUser) 
 4 public view 
 2 returns(bool _isRegisteredUser){ 
 3    return isRegisteredUser[msg.sender][_registeredUser]; 
 4 } 
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Swether platform is managed by a single organization, so there are only one owner tenant 
and a few administrator tenants. If the platform is adopted into a consumer market, it is 
sensible to have different owners and administrators for each module. 
Charging station owners are also relevant tenants since they are the ones providing the 
hardware that provides the service offered on our platform. Without them, there is no sense 
in having a charging platform. 
And of course, there are charging service customers. They are the ones using the charging 
service and the ones that provide the funds for charging station owners to keep their 
charging stations operational. 
There are four levels of tenants required to interact with various modules, based on what 
their interest is. 
 
Table 2: Module tenant interactions 
 
Module Tenant Reasons for interaction 
Administration Owner • Migrating 
module to a new 
version of smart 
contract 
Smart Contract Directory Owner, Administrator, 
Charging station owner, 
Charging service customer 
• Getting the 
smart contract 
address of the 
Core module 
Core Owner, Administrator • Administrative 
methods of the 
module 
• Interacting with 
other modules 
using SCT 
Charging station owner, 
Charging service customer 
• Interacting with 
other modules 
using SCT 
Charging Station Directory Owner, Administrator • Administrative 
methods of the 
module 
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Charging service customer • Operational 
methods to use 
charging service 
Escrow Owner, Administrator • Administrative 
methods of the 
module 
Charging service customer • Confirming the 
escrow 
completion 
Loyalty Owner, Administrator • Administrative 
methods of the 
module 
Charging service customer • Usage methods 








Owner, Administrator • Administrative 
methods of the 
module 
Charging station owner • Use of module’s 




As can be seen in table 2, various modules allow various tenants to interact with them. Not 
all of the modules are meant to provide service for all of the tenants and thus it makes sense 
to have per-module access control implemented. All the access control is executed using 
the Administration module and is additionally secured using the Smart Contract Tunnelling 
mechanism. 
Four levels of tenants are sufficient, so we can implement their classification in a more use 
case agnostic way than we did at the beginning of this chapter in section 5.2.3. The top-
level administrator should always be one and the convention is that it is called Owner. The 
second tier of administrators represents a group of tenants that work together to provide the 
optimal service operation and they are called Administrators. The third group of tenants is 
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a group of users that are allowed to call certain methods that are restricted to the public but 
are part of the service operation group of methods. These users are called Registered users 
and, in our case, these are Charging station owners and Charging service customers, 
depending on the module. The last group of tenants are the unregistered users. They are 
allowed to execute methods that are unrestricted and provided indiscriminately to anyone. 
 
Table 3: Tenant tier explanation 
 
Tenant title Role description Example tenants 
Owner Top-level administration 
tenant charged with 
governance over the module 
and lower-tier tenants. 
• Module owner 
• Platform owner 
Administrator Second-tier level 
administration tenant 
charged with the 
maintenance of the module 




Registered user Third-tier tenant with 
permissions to interact with 
service methods restricted 
from public use. 
• Charging station 
owner 
• Charging service 
customer 
Unregistered user Fourth-tier tenant with 
permissions to use publicly 
available methods. 
• Charging service 
customer 
As it was mentioned in the subchapter 5.2.3, we can also implement tenant sub-levels 
restricted to a specific module, the same way Charging stations are introduced as a sub-
level of registered users in the Charging station directory module. 
5.4.Improvements 
The planned upgrade of the Swether platform to version 1.0.0 intended to provide security 
updates to the platform, improve code base health and provide the previously unsupported 
upgradeability and data migration features. Smart contract tunnelling was developed and 
implemented to further increase the security of the platform. 




In the planning part of the Swether v 1.x implementation, modules were defined and 
classified into three groups of modules: Platform agnostic, Platform specific and Auxiliary 
modules. Having specified and classified modules that are not only platform-specific but 
can also be agnostic of the platform or provide an auxiliary feature to a solution no matter 
the use case provides the ability to apply a similar approach to any platform based 
blockchain solution. This could be in the fields of IoT, robotics, ecology, philanthropy, and 
many more. 
Platform agnostic modules: Administration and Smart contract directory module, provide 
the basis of any multi-tenant, multi-module, upgradeable blockchain solution. They provide 
the basic building blocks that enable secure inter-module interaction utilizing Smart 
contract tunnelling and reliable and secure migrations of data and access control to the 
updated or upgraded smart contract of a module. 
5.4.2.Increased codebase maintainability 
Maintainability of codebase increases when large code is transformed into smaller, separate 
but interacting pieces of code. As the logic inside each module is the only necessary logic 
for that module’s operation, modifications can only have a module-level impact. Which 
means that an error in a module will result only in the module malfunction and not in 
platform-wide malfunction. This way any issues can be identified quicker and addressed on 
a per-module level instead of verifying the whole platform for successful resolution of the 
issue. 
Splitting the legacy smart contract into multiple modules to increase the security of the 
platform introduced the increased complexity of interaction and access control, but 
significantly lowered per module executable methods. Executable methods are methods that 
are executed in the module and are not just called in the module, executed in another and 
the resulting data used in the first one. 
 
Table 4: Per module method number comparison 
 
Module Executable methods External methods 
Swether v 0.x 26 0 
Administration 13 0 
Smart contract directory 6 1 
Core 4 26 
Charging station directory 15 2 
Accumulator 7 2 
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Escrow 10 2 
Loyalty 11 2 
 
As it can be observed in Table 4, the fragmentation of legacy smart contract into modules 
resulted in less executable methods per module, which improves the ability to maintain and 
securely develop the functionality of the platform. The Charging station directory is the 
module with the most executable methods in the multi smart contract ecosystem has 15 
executable methods compared to 26 executable transactions in the Swether v 0.x smart 
contract which is 42.31% less. Most of the modules use some of the methods from the other 
modules. The majority of modules only use two of the methods from any other module. 
Only the Core module uses 26 external methods, which is the same as there were executable 
methods in the legacy smart contract. It is worth noting that the new multi smart contract 
environment is using two completely new modules, that were not present in the Swether v 
0.x solution and that the Core module is the only user-facing module, so it has to provide 
pass-through calls to all of the methods meant to be called by any kind of tenant. 
The cumulative number of executable methods in the multi smart contract ecosystem is 
roughly 2.5 times the number of the executable methods in the Swether v 0.x smart contract. 
This is due to the increase of per module security and fragmentation of larger methods into 
smaller complementary methods. 
The low number of external methods required in all the modules, excluding the Core 
module, is indicative of successful definition and design of the modules that are able to 
serve their purpose without having to constantly rely on the other modules. This means that 
maintaining, updating and further developing any given module can be performed without 
much, if any, disruption to other modules. 
5.4.3.Deploy and update improvements 
Compared to Swether 0.x, the Swether 1.x implementation has a clearer deployment as well 
as updating procedures. Smart contract source codes are contained in an ERC 190 compliant 
format, which allows us to use deployment scripts, called migrations, and per network 
deployment configuration. This allows us to deploy the solution to private Ethereum 
network when updates to smart contracts are being developed and to any of the production 
networks, we desire just bypassing the target network for the deploy when calling the 
deployment scripts. Having migrations that automate the deployment of the smart contracts 
reduces the risk factor of human error when deploying and during initial configuration. 
When updates to smart contracts are applied to the source code, new migration can be 
written to update the changed smart contract and reconfigure the platform. The updated 
smart contract can be substituted while keeping the non-updated ones operational. This 
migration can also establish connections between the newly deployed smart contract and 
the previously deployed smart contracts. 
54 Swether - from rudimentary DAPP to secure, scalable and reliable service 
 
 
ERC 190 packaging of Swether 1.x also allows us to have unit tests written for each of the 
smart contracts. This enables us to be less reliant on manually testing the platform and have 
a higher degree of certainty that the platform behaves as expected. 
 
5.4.4.Secure module and user interaction 
Keeping secure inter-module and user-platform interaction in mind when implementing the 
solution allowed for highly transparent communication while still maintaining as high of a 
level of secure interaction as possible. The interactions might be more complex now since 
we are using the Smart Contract Tunnelling approach to inter-module communication but 
since the approach on how it is implemented and executed has been clearly designed, it is 
straightforward to implement and understand. 
Increased interaction complexity was introduced by placing one relay module between the 
users and the executable method containing modules. Since there was only one smart 
contract that the users used and interacted with, the interaction, as well as the access control, 
was simple. The only thing needed for access control was msg.sender value of the 
transaction. 
Introducing multiple modules that the user interacts with without knowing the address of 
the module, required the design of a new way of ensuring the security and legitimacy of the 
transactions, which was accomplished with the design of Smart Contract Tunnelling. Smart 
Contract Tunnelling does not introduce much complexity to the design of the smart contract, 
but it significantly increases the security of communication and execution of methods in a 
multi smart contract environment. 
   
Figure 14: Representation of required steps to set up Smart contract tunnelling 




Figure 15: Representation of increased interaction complexity in the new multi-contract environment 
with Smart contract tunnelling 
As depicted in Figures 14 and 15, the number of steps needed for the successful execution 
of a single method call has increased by a number of steps required to set up the Smart 
contract tunnelling, which is three steps for each module and one additional step per module 
subscription. Every module has to be registered with the Administration and Smart contract 
directory module that is used to provide Smart contract tunnelling security (SCT). As the 
SCT tunnels are established, methods contained in the modules can be called by the user 
without their knowledge of the smart contract ecosystem providing the service and without 
having to keep track of the addresses of all of the modules used in the platform. The user 
only has to know the address of the pass-through module, which simplifies the design of 
the user interface and simplifies the interaction with the platform. 
5.4.5.Security analysis of multi smart contract solution 
Security analysis of the module smart contracts was performed using MythX security audit 
tool developed by Consensys[65]. For an easier frame of reference, the legacy Swether 
smart contract was analysed with the same tool. 
The MythX tool checks for SWC violations and classifies them into three categories based 
on security risk: high, medium and low. High severity security risk violations are the 
violations that can critically impact the security of the data of the operation of the smart 
contract. Medium severity level violations allow the smart contract to be impacted by 
exploiting the vulnerability of the way the method is executed either by a skilled attacker 
or by a malicious smart contract. Low severity security violations are violations that mostly 
don’t follow the code styling and values presenting and storing conventions. 
The security violation report can provide a reference on what issues to fix, but some of the 
issues can be made intentionally, so the report can provide additional insight into what 
consequences the intentional SWC violations can have. 
 
Table 5: MythX standard security analysis per module number of violations 
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Swether v 0.x 3 6 10 14 5 
Administration 1 0 23 24 0 
Smart contract 
directory 
4 1 10 15 0 




0 2 37 39 0 
Accumulator 0 2 39 41 0 
Escrow 0 2 41 43 0 
Loyalty 0 0 17 17 0 
 
 
Table 5 contains the data of how many SWC violations a module has raised using MythX 
standard analysis and of which level of severity they were. The legacy smart contract raises 
three high severity violations. All of them are concerning SWC-101[66] (The arithmetic 
operation can overflow), which means that there is no check implemented for 256-bit 
unsigned integer data structure in case of over- or underflow. The violations were included 
in the view functions and couldn't be exploited by an attacker, The medium severity level 
violations are mostly concerning SWC-128[67] (Loop over unbounded data structure). 
They were implemented in the data structures that are adding new data on top of the storage 
stack, but sometimes need to remove a certain piece of data contained in the middle of the 
stack. Since Solidity does not support deletion of data on this scale and reindexing of the 
following data, these loops were implemented. The low severity violations were mostly 
concerning SWC-108 [68](State variable visibility is not set). These violations were 
intentional as well. Since Solidity defaults non-set visibility for variables to internal the 
visibility setting was omitted, the desired visibility is set by the Solidity form the start. 
Legacy smart contract was well written and programmed taking into account all of the 
security aspects of the smart contract development as it was. The main issue with it is the 
bloat of the smart contract and the lack of support for updates and upgrades that were not 
included in the design. 
Administration module has one high severity violation which is SWC-101 violation and is 
implemented by design and not by an error. Multiple low severity violations are shared with 
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all of the modules of the new multi smart contract environment. There are numerous SWC-
108 violations. Most of the variables raising this violation are presented through view 
methods that are free for the user to execute and are better to be implemented in this way 
since it is easier to develop a user interface that shows these values on initiation by calling 
the view methods it requires. Each module also has an SWC-100[69] (Function visibility is 
not set) violation which is included in the constructor methods. The constructor method is 
a method used to deploy the smart contract and does not require the visibility parameters 
since the Solidity version 7.0.0. SWC-115 [63](Use of "tx.origin" as a part of authorization 
control)  violation is included because of the Smart Contract Tunnelling (SCT) support. The 
testing tool is unable to recognise it since the SCT was developed and implemented in the 
security upgrade part of this thesis. There are also a lot of SWC-107[70] (A call to a user-
supplied address is executed) violations, which are included in the administrative methods 
of the modules and are required to support multi smart contract ecosystem. SWC-123[71] 
(Requirement violation) violations are present due to the upgradeability part of the module. 
Methods that are called legitimately after the module has been upgraded should not be 
executed since there is a new smart contract deployed and running to represent this module. 
Smart contract directory has four SWC-101 high severity security violations included by 
design. The medium severity security violation violates SWC-107 (Read of persistent state 
following external call) and is implemented due to a one-time action needed to register 
Administration module address services. After the initial Administration connection is 
established, the changing of its address should not be allowed. The low severity security 
violations are SWC numbers 100, 107, 108, and 123. 
Core module has two medium severity level violations which are both SWC-107 violations. 
The low severity level violations are SWC-107, SWC-113 and SWC-123. SWC-113 
(Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction) pertains to the multiple calls the 
method in the module does sequentially that have executed one after another and have to 
all be successful or all of the changes caused by the transaction have to be reverted to the 
original state. 
Charging station directory only has one medium severity level violation of SWC-107. The 
remainder of the violations are of low severity and are violations of SWC-107, SWC-113, 
SWC-115, and SWC-123. 
All of the auxiliary modules have similar SWC violations that are made and kept after 
careful deliberation and are not caused by mistake or by the lack of knowledge. 
It is worth noting that the SWC-107 was included in the medium and low severity results 
and named differently because it concerns the interaction with other smart contracts and can 
impact different parts of the codebase. 
5.5.What lays ahead 
The overhaul that was needed was not the end of the road for the Swether project. It was a 
necessary and important step towards greater security of the platform and its usability, but 
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there are many more possible upgrades that can make the current solution even better to use 
and more secure. 
5.5.1.Consortium network 
One of the biggest usability upgrades would be to move certain modules to the consortium 
network. Using a consortium network would allow for higher transaction throughput and 
possibly no transaction fees when using the modules that don’t require the robustness of the 
public blockchain network. Robustness is meant in a sense of greater security as well as 
connectivity. Connectivity of the consortium network would depend on the consortium run 
boot nodes, which would be fewer than in the public network. 
Some modules, like Loyalty and Charging station directory modules, are suitable to be 
moved to the consortium network since they don’t directly interact with any cryptocurrency. 
Of course, this introduces a need for atomic swap to connect the main network, but this is 
quite trivial to implement if the clear guidelines were followed. 
If none of the modules requires the use of a cryptocurrency, the whole DAPP can be moved 
to a consortium network. Such an implementation would require the use of ERC20 tokens 
in order to allow tenants to pay for the service or be paid for the service they provide. 
5.5.2.Additional modules 
Consortium network enables us to develop new modules that require more interactions 
before they provide any kind of service. One such module is a Marketplace module which 
allows placing bids on a charging station and the charging station can decide which bid to 
accept while notifying every other bidder that the bidding is over. Such a module is unviable 
in a public blockchain since numerous transactions are required to provide even the simplest 
of functionalities. 
5.5.3.Maintenance 
Since there are clearly defined modules with logically complete sets of methods, the 
maintenance is significantly easier as it was with the legacy Swether. Security 
enhancements to the Solidity language as well as to the programming patterns and 
interactions with smart contracts are regularly evolving and are being updated, so the 
maintenance of the modules will have to be a regular and periodical practice. The new 
modules all have the ability to be updated or upgraded built into their design so that only a 
single module can be updated with no impact on the other modules. The update of the 
module can also be executed without any knowledge of any other module, which simplifies 
the process of platform maintenance. 
5.5.4.Ethereum improvement proposals 
Smart contract tunnelling was developed to support our multi smart contract environment 
that required per module access control. Since there were no solutions available in the global 
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community the responsible thing to do is to thoroughly document it and publish it as an 
Ethereum Improvement Proposal (EIP) with a goal of it becoming an Ethereum Request for 
Comments. 
The upgradeable and modular platform has multiple common points to the Diamond 
standard, which however does not foresee the secure inter-module interactions. The 
Swether v 1.x platform was designed independent of the Diamond standard and it is our 
responsibility to propose an upgrade of it to support secure inter-module interactions, which 
are lacking in that EIP. 
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6. Conclusions 
Security update of Swether smart contract required the invention of a new way of interacting 
with platforms utilizing multiple smart contracts. The lack of authentication mechanisms, 
that are present in current centralized web solutions, had to be overcome and it was done 
by implementing Smart Contract Tunneling. This is one of the most important results of our 
work in the thesis. 
The updated multi-tenant multi-contract platform that is more manageable and easily 
upgradeable is a significant leap in improving Swether as a DAPP. The resulting platform 
is ready to be handed off to a new developer or development team, if necessary, as well as 
ready for quicker improvement and security updating cycles. 
Smart Contract Tunneling can be prepared for standardization and published as an 
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